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1. Iqwurgxfwlrq
Reward schemes based on relative performance are widely used and often constitute
the main motivating device, as with employees in large organizations competing for
bonuses or promotions. Following Lazear and Rosen (1981), the properties and raison
d’être of tournaments have been extensively discussed.1 The present paper analyzes
their proﬁtability, from the principals’ point of view, when agents have a distaste for
unequal payoﬀs relative to their reference group.
A standard justiﬁcation for tournaments is that relative comparisons are often
easier to make than absolute judgments. Tournaments also commit an organiza-
tion to a ﬁxed prize structure. When performance evaluation is subjective, this is
useful in eliminating incentives to underreport performance so as to avoid paying
bonuses; conversely, it counteracts the leniency bias of evaluators reluctant to distin-
guish between good and bad performance. Tournaments motivate agents by creating
situations where ranking cannot be avoided. This generates strong incentives, but it
also confronts contestants with the certainty of unequal payoﬀs between peers.
In the usual formulation, agents care about ranking only to the extent that it
aﬀects their own absolute payoﬀ. There is no room for rivalry per se, for instance the
satisfaction from outperforming rivals. Neither is there room for the possibility that
individuals resent earning less than their peers or conversely that they feel uneasy
when earning more through mere luck. A large empirical literature — not to mention
a long tradition in social psychology — suggests that such concerns matter for the
individuals’ well being.2 They may also aﬀect behavior in important ways. As shown
by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) who draw on ﬁndings
from the experimental literature, a distaste for inequality in payoﬀ distributions has
much explanatory power.
1See Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983), Malcomson (1984) and additional references in Gibbons and
Waldman (1999) and Prendergast (1999).
2See Loewenstein, Thomson and Bazerman (1989), Clark and Oswald (1996) and the numerous
references therein, as well as those in Akerlof and Yellen (1990) for instance.2
We consider the implications on the cost of using tournaments as incentive schemes
when agents are concerned with relative payoﬀs. Our starting point is the concept
of ‘self-centered inequity aversion’ as deﬁned in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Although
agents care about their absolute payoﬀ as in the economist’s standard model, they are
also interested in the ‘fairness’ of their payoﬀ relative to that of others. An individual
experiences dissatisfaction if he is worse oﬀ than his reference group (disadvantageous
inequity) and may perhaps also suﬀer dissatisfaction if better oﬀ (advantageous in-
equity). He nevertheless suﬀers more from inequity that is to his disadvantage than
from one to his advantage. We qualify the notion of inequity aversion by also allow-
ing for the possibility that agents obtain satisfaction from outperforming rivals. Our
agents nevertheless remain ‘inequality averse’ in the sense that they suﬀer more from
being outdone than they would gain from outdoing their rivals by the same margin.
Intuitively, the principal cannot proﬁt from a distaste for advantageous inequity
on the part of the contestants – empathy with the losers. The reason is that this
introduces a wedge between what is paid to the winning agent and his subjective
beneﬁt, thereby reducing the utility gain from winning. But what about a distaste
for disadvantageous inequity, which may be interpreted as envy or frustration from
losing? For a given prize structure, this increases the utility diﬀerence between win-
ning and losing and therefore increases incentives. The principal can then reduce the
spread between money prizes and still induce the same eﬀort. On the other hand,
the disutility of losing the tournament is now greater, which presumably reduces the
agents’ willingness to participate (as when someone refuses to play a game because
he ‘hates to lose’), thus requiring compensation from the principal. As far as the
principal’s costs are concerned, the consequences of dealing with more envious agents
therefore appear to be ambiguous.
As noted by Fehr and Schmidt (2002), there is hardly any theoretical literature on
the interaction between the agents’ concern for equity and the provision of incentives.3
3But see the recent paper by Englmaier and Wambach (2002).3
In the context of tournament models, Kräkel (2000) examined the inﬂuence of ‘relative
deprivation’ on the contestants’ eﬀort decision. He shows that, for given tournament
prizes, agents concerned only about relative income exert more eﬀo r tt h a ni ft h e y
maximized their expected absolute payoﬀ. However, this contribution does not study
the optimal prize structure from the principal’s point of view. In a paper written
concurrently with ours, Grund and Sliwka (2002) develop a model similar to the one
presented here. We diﬀer by assuming that agents face a liability limit (the workers’
wage cannot be negative), which introduces the possibility that they earn rent in the
optimal tournament. Moreover, our principal is able at a cost to increase the extent to
which the ranking of contestants provides information about relative eﬀort. The idea
is that a more elaborate albeit more costly tournament design (e.g. a more thorough
ranking procedure) reduces the inﬂuence of luck on the outcome. Thus, a tournament
is characterized here both by its prize structure and its ranking procedure.4
We determine the cost function of eﬀort from the principal’s point of view; that
is, we consider the cost to the principal of inducing arbitrary levels of eﬀort. When
the agents’ liability limit is not binding in the optimal tournament, our conclusion
is that the principal would not beneﬁt from more envious contestants, as in Grund
and Sliwka (2002). As suggested above, the intuition is then that contestants must
be compensated for the expected frustration of turning out losers. This conclusion
is reversed if the agents’ liability limit is binding and they earn rent. Such a case
necessarily arises when organizing informative tournaments is suﬃciently costly. The
intuition is now that, because they are more ‘aggressive’, more envious contestants
allow the principal both to reduce the winning prize (thus reducing the agents’ rent)
and to economize on the costs of the ranking procedure. With binding liability limits,
more envious contestants can also beneﬁt the principal even when there is no rent.
Although such agents need to be paid more in expected value, the principal beneﬁts
4We also assume that agents assess equity in terms of income net of eﬀort costs. They would
therefore experience inequity if they earned the same income, but had exerted diﬀerent eﬀort levels
(see also Akerlof and Yellen (1990) or Levine (1991) for instance).4
from using a coarser and therefore less costly ranking procedure.
The next two sections describe our basic framework, assuming a two-contestant
tournament for simplicity. Section 4 derives the optimal wage structure when the
informational properties of the tournament are taken as given. Section 5 analyzes the
optimal tournament design with endogenous precision and presents our main results.
Section 6 discusses the implications and concludes.
2. Puhihuhqfhv
A contest is used to create incentives in a moral hazard situation with two identical
risk neutral workers i =1 ,2. The workers dislike inequities relative to their reference
group which in this case is limited to the other contestant. Speciﬁcally, following Fehr
and Schmidt (1999), we write the utility of payoﬀ πi when the co-worker earns πj as
U(πi,πj)=πi − [αmax(πj − πi,0) + β max(πi − πj,0)],i , j =1 ,2 (1)
The terms in the square bracket are the utility eﬀects of disadvantageous and advan-
tageous inequality respectively. Fehr and Schmidt assume α > β and 0 ≤ β < 1.T h e
implication is that a worse oﬀ individual is willing to trade-oﬀ some of his personal
gain against a decrease in his peer’s payoﬀ. This may denote envy or the disutility
of being outdone. When β > 0, a better oﬀ individual is fair-minded (or suﬀers from
t h ee n v yo fo t h e r s )s i n c eh ew o u l dt r a d e - o ﬀ some decrease in his personal gain against
an increase in the peer’s payoﬀ. β < 1 implies that a worker always beneﬁts from an
increase in his own payoﬀ, while α > β means that he dislikes a diﬀerence against
him more than one in his favor.
In this formulation inequities between workers are always a source of disutility.
This can be relaxed somewhat by allowing β to be negative, i.e. by considering the
possibility that an individual obtains satisfaction from being better oﬀ than others.
We impose α > |β| so that the disutility from being outperformed is greater than the































Utility as a function of own payoﬀ is represented in ﬁgure 1a for the case where
β is negative. α > |β| implies concavity, which amounts to risk aversion with respect6
to gambles with the possibility of turning out ahead or behind one’s peer. This holds
irrespective of the sign of β but a positive value would lead to greater risk aversion.
In ﬁgure 1b, the individual’s utility is drawn as a function of the peer’s payoﬀ.U t i l i t y
is everywhere decreasing if β is negative as in the ﬁgure, while with a positive β a
maximum is reached at the point where payoﬀs are equalized. In either case α > |β|
implies concavity in ﬁgure 1b.
The preceding assumptions characterize inequality aversion, even though one may
possibly obtain satisfaction from outperforming one’s peer – and although in some
cases an inequality averse individual also exhibits risk aversion in the usual sense. To
make this clear, suppose individual i faces equal chances of getting π + ε or π − ε,
while his peer gets π for sure. With ε positive, individual i’s expected utility is then
U
i = π − 1
2(α + β)ε (2)
Since α > |β| implies α+β > 0, individual i is risk averse in the sense that he would
prefer π for sure. Suppose now that i gets π for sure while his peer faces equal chances
of getting π + ε or π − ε. Individual i’s utility is again as in (2), i.e. he would prefer
that his peer also gets π f o rs u r e .T h es e c o n dt e r mi n( 2 )w i l lb er e f e r r e dt oa st h e
inequality premium.
3. Tkh wrxuqdphqw frqwudfw
The contest is deﬁned by its prize structure and the performance evaluation process.
We write l and w for the wages of the losing and the winning party respectively. The
net payoﬀ of a worker undertaking eﬀort e is then either π = l−c(e) or π = w−c(e)
where c(e) is the cost of undertaking eﬀort, an increasing and strictly convex function.
Though e is not contractible, workers are assumed to see each other’s eﬀort and are
therefore able, at the end of the contest, to compare their net payoﬀ.G i v e n t h e
tournament design, the principal observes for each worker a performance measure
xi = ei + εi,i =1 ,2 (3)7
where the εi’s are i.i.d. error terms. The xi’s can generally be thought as aggregating
information from various sources. Some measures may be readily available like sales
data pertaining to a salesperson, while others are costly to gather or may reﬂect soft
information like the principal’s more or less subjective appreciation. The care or
thoroughness with which performance is assessed is part of the tournament design
and is a decision variable from the principal’s point of view. Greater precision in
relative performance assessment requires a more costly tournament. We assume this
is contractible, i.e. the principal can commit to some level of precision.5
The party with the best outcome wins. Thus, agent i prevails if xi >x j or
equivalently εj − εi <e i − ej.D e n o t i n gw i t hH the c.d.f. of the diﬀerence in error
terms for a given tournament design, worker i wins the contest with probability
H(ei − ej). The agent’s optimization problem is therefore
max
e e
E [U|e e,e]=H(e e − e)uw(e e,e)+[ 1− H(e e − e)]ul(e e,e) (I)
where e denotes the eﬀort of the other contestant at the Nash equilibrium and where
uw and ul are short-hand for the worker’s utility upon winning or losing.
We assume the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Since both
contestants have the same preferences, the equilibrium is symmetric and we derive
the cost to the principal of implementing some arbitrary eﬀort level e. The principal’s




E [U|e e,e] (IC)
E [U|e,e] ≥ uA (PC)
l ≥ 0 (NC)
The ﬁrst equation is the worker’s incentive compatibility constraint at the Nash equi-
librium. The next condition guarantees that it is in each workers’ interest to par-
5For instance, in many sports contests ‘precision’ is veriﬁable as it depends on the number of
games that must be played before picking a winner.8
ticipate in the contest, given the utility uA ≥ 0 in an alternative occupation. The
last inequality is a limited liability condition reﬂecting the capital-market constraints
faced by workers and which restrict the use of bonding or entrance fees. For simplicity,
the ﬂoor wage is required here to be non-negative.
4. Tkh zdjh vwuxfwxuh
We ﬁrst determine the wage structure to induce eﬀort e, taking as given the informa-
tional properties of the tournament design. At the symmetric Nash equilibrium, the
probability that either party wins is H(0) = 1
2. From the workers’ optimization prob-
lem and denoting H (0) ≡ h, the incentive compatibility constraint can be rewritten
as the ﬁrst order condition6










=0 , for e e = e (4)
The ﬁrst term is the marginal beneﬁt from greater eﬀort through the increased
probability of winning. The second term is the expected marginal disutility of eﬀort.
The utility of winning or losing when one expends eﬀort e e while the other exerts e is
respectively
uw(e e,e)=w − c(e e) − β [(w − c(e e)) − (l − c(e))] (5)
ul(e e,e)=l − c(e e) − α[(w − c(e)) − (l − c(e e))] (6)
Since w>land for e e not too diﬀerent from e, the payoﬀ upon winning is greater
than the payoﬀ to the other party, hence the value of uw in (5). Similarly, the payoﬀ
upon losing is less than that of the other party, leading to ul as deﬁned in (6).
Denoting the wage spread by ∆w = w−l, the diﬀerence in utility between winning
and losing in the ﬁrst-order condition (4) is
(uw − ul)|e=e e =( 1+α − β)∆w (7)
6A pure strategy equilibrium exists, with the agents’ behavior described by the ﬁrst-order con-
dition, only if chance is a signiﬁcant factor in the outcome of the contest (see Lazear and Rosen
(1981) and Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983)). This is assumed throughout.9
Under inequality aversion, the utility spread is larger than the wage spread. The


















The marginal disutility of eﬀort depends on whether the worker wins or loses the
contest. If he wins, the utility loss from greater eﬀort is (1−β)c (e). For a fair-minded
individual (β > 0)t h i si sl e s st h a nt h em a r g i n a le ﬀo r tc o s ta sw o r k i n gm o r em a k e s
winning appear less unfair. Conversely, it is greater if the individual is greedy (β < 0)
since his payoﬀ advantage is then reduced. If the worker loses after marginally raising
eﬀort, the utility loss from greater eﬀort is (1 + α)c (e). The marginal disutility is
then greater than the marginal eﬀort cost because it now appears all the more unjust
to lose. Taking expected values, inequality aversion has the same eﬀect as raising the
marginal cost of eﬀort by the factor 1
2(α − β).
Inequality aversion magniﬁes both the utility eﬀect of the wage spread and the
marginal cost of eﬀort. Substituting from (7) and (8) in the ﬁrst-order condition (4),









Overall the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates since λ < 1.M o r e o v e r , λ is decreasing in α and
increasing in β.
Proposition 1. F o rg i v e np e r f o r m a n c em e a s u r e s ,t h ew a g es p r e a dr e q u i r e df o ri n -
ducing a given eﬀort level is decreasing in α and increasing in β.
Alternatively, given the wage spread, eﬀort is increasing in α and decreasing in
β. The result suggests that hiring more envious or less fair-minded workers may
lower the costs to the principal by reducing the wage spread needed to provide the
adequate incentives. However, the wage structure must also induce participation and
be compatible with the workers’ ﬁnancial limits.10
The expected per worker wage is
1
2w + 1
2l = l + 1
2∆w (10)
The wage spread being determined by the incentive requirement, the principal mini-
mizes wage costs by setting the ﬂoor wage as small as possible, subject to the limited






e=e e = l + 1
2(1 − α − β)∆w − c(e) ≥ uA (PC)
The two constraints cannot simultaneously be slack, otherwise the principal could
lower his wage costs by reducing the ﬂoor wage. There are therefore two possibilities:
either
l = uA + c(e) − 1
2(1 − α − β)∆w ≥ 0 (11)
and the participation constraint is binding or the workers earn rent and l =0 .
Nru h q w . Substituting for l from the binding participation constraint and writing
W(e) for the expected wage required to induce eﬀort level e,w eh a v e
W(e)= uA + c(e)+1
2(α + β)∆w
= uA + c(e)+µ
c (e)
2h
where µ = λ(α + β) (12)
The third term on the right hand side is the inequality premium.7 It is easily checked
that µ is increasing in both α and β. Hence, when no rent is earned, inequality aver-
sion is undesirable since it increases wage costs. Moreover, wage costs are increasing
with the extent of the worker’s concern with relative payoﬀs.
Rhqw. The no rent case occurs only when the previous ﬂoor wage is compatible
with the workers’ ﬁnancial constraint. The inequality in (11) always holds if the
workers’ concern with relative payoﬀs is strong in the sense that α+β > 1.O t h e r w i s e ,
7The expression for the inequality premium is thes a m ea si n( 2 ) ,g i v e nt h a tt h ew a g eg a pb e t w e e n
the workers is now ∆w and may be advantageous or disadvantageous with probability one half.11
whether or not the inequality holds depends on the size of the required wage spread
relative to the reservation utility and the cost of eﬀort. In the remaining, we assume
inequality aversion is not too large, i.e. α+β < 1. From (11), when the required wage
spread is suﬃciently large, the ﬂoor wage consistent with no rent becomes negative,
thus violating the workers’ liability limit. Hence the principal must set l =0and






In this case, the eﬀect on wage costs of changes in the externality parameters follows
directly from the results in Proposition 1. Combining the rent and no-rent situations,
we get the following characterization.
Proposition 2. For given performance measures, wage costs are increasing in β.
They are increasing in α in no-rent cases and decreasing if workers earn rent.
Empathy with the loser is therefore bad from the point of view of wage costs,
while greater satisfaction from outperforming one’s rival is beneﬁcial. The eﬀect of
envy depends on the situation. When workers earn rent, a principal who could choose
the workers’ types would prefer more envious workers.
5. Trxuqdphqw ghvljq
We now turn to the informational properties of the tournament, which until now
have been taken as given. As is well known, h = H (0) reﬂects the importance of
luck in the outcome of the contest, which in turn depends on how carefully relative
performance is assessed. To see this, note that 2h = ∂ logH(e e − e)/∂e e evaluated at
e e = e.T h a ti s ,h reﬂects the extent to which a change in eﬀort aﬀects the probability
of winning, which is a natural measure of the precision of the underlying information
structure.8
8See O’Keefe et al. (1984) or Hvide (2002) for similar observations and Demougin and Fluet
(2001) for an analysis along these lines in the context of individualistic wage schemes. Alternatively,12
Everything else equal, whether or not workers earn rent depends on the importance












The ﬁrst expression on the right hand side is for the situation with rent, when per
worker wage costs equal the expected wage spread. The second expression is for the
no rent case, with wage costs equal to sum of the worker’s reservation utility and eﬀort
cost, plus the inequality premium. Since α + β < 1 implies λ >µ , the expression for
the case with rent is the relevant one for small values of h.








where both the rent and no-rent expressions are equal. The intuition is that better
information reduces the wage spread required to induce a given eﬀort level. In the
rent case, this translates directly into lower wage costs. In the region with positive
rent, a smaller wage spread means a smaller inequality premium, so that greater
precision again leads to lower wage costs.
Wage costs are also convex in h. That is, the marginal beneﬁt from greater














where the notation refers to the left and right derivatives at h = hc.C o n v e x i t yw i t h
respect to h means that a marginal increase in precision has a greater eﬀect on wage
costs the lower the initial precision. In particular, the beneﬁts to the principal from
an increase in h are greater when the workers extract rent than under no rent (see
ﬁgure 2).
it is easily seen that the density H  is symmetric around zero with variance equal to 2Va r (εi).T h u s ,
a larger variance in the error terms implies a smaller h (see Lazear, 1995).13
Allowing the principal to design the information content of the contest, we now
assume the principal can initially commit to some h, incurring a per worker cost
γ(h) with γ  > 0 and γ   ≥ 0. When more resources are invested in the tournament
procedure, the outcome of the contest provides better information about potential
diﬀerences between the contestants’ eﬀort. Of course, in equilibrium both contestants
c h o o s et h es a m ee ﬀort level. Nevertheless, precision matters since for a given wage
structure it determines the incentives to supply eﬀort. The principal’s problem is
now to choose the least cost tournament subject to the incentive, participation and
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Figure 2
The determination of the optimal precision is illustrated in ﬁgure 2. With precision
costs such as γ 
1 or γ 
3, the solution is an interior one equating marginal precision costs
and marginal beneﬁts in terms of wage reduction. For intermediate costs such as γ 
2,14
we have the corner solution h∗ = hc where both the participation and limited liability
constraints are binding. Such situations are now no longer non generic, by contrast
with the preceding section where precision was taken as given. Small changes in
precision costs around γ 
2 do not aﬀect the solution h∗ = hc. Changes in the other
parameters will shift hc to the right or to the left, but h∗ = hc remains optimal if
such changes are not too large.
We now examine how the externality parameters aﬀect the principal’s total costs
and the optimal tournament design. When the solution is an interior one, the cost
eﬀects are qualitatively the same as in the foregoing section (and follow from the







and the change in costs is the sum of the direct eﬀect on λ a n do ft h ee ﬀect on hc as
























As can be seen from the ﬁgure, the expression in the ﬁrst square bracket is positive,
that in the second is negative. Recalling that λ is decreasing in α while µ is increasing,
whether a larger α increases or decreases costs therefore depends on the marginal cost
of precision. When this is large, i.e. near the upper beneﬁtc u r v ei nt h eﬁgure, the
term in the second square bracket is negligible and consequently dCP/dα < 0.T h e
sign is reversed when γ (hc) is near the lower beneﬁt curve. The proof of the next
proposition and of the foregoing statements is in the appendix.
Proposition 3. The principal’s total costs are increasing in β. They are respectively
decreasing in α when precision is relatively costly and increasing when it is relatively
cheap.15
Everything else equal, the principal never beneﬁts from more compassionate work-
ers and whether he beneﬁts from more envious ones depends on how costly it is to
provide a careful assessment of relative performance. The eﬀects on wage spread,
total wage costs and optimal precision are summarized in the tables 1 and 2 (see the
appendix for the proofs).
Table 1: eﬀect of increases in α
rent > 0, l =0 rent =0 , l =0 rent =0 , l>0
CP −
− if γ  is large
+ if γ  is small
+
h −−+
∆w − + −
W − ++
Table 2: eﬀect of increases in β
rent > 0, l =0 rent =0 , l =0 rent =0 , l>0
CP +++
h + − +
∆w ++?
W +++
In the ﬁrst column, precision costs are large and workers extract rent. An increase
in α then leads to a smaller wage spread, since envy provides more incentives, and
also allows the principal to economize on precision costs (an increase in β has the
opposite eﬀects). In the last column, precision costs are small and there is no rent.
An increase in either α or β then leads the principal to choose a more informative16
tournament design in order to reduce the inequality premium. The increase in h
following an increase in α unambiguously reduces the wage spread. By contrast, the
eﬀect of a larger β is ambiguous. By itself it would reduce incentives and require a
larger spread. However, the ensuing increase in h may be such as to allow a smaller
wage spread.
The eﬀects for corner solutions shown in the middle column may be non intu-
itive. Consider an increase in α. If the tournament design remained unchanged, this
would reduce the workers’ expected utility because of the larger inequality premium.
To maintain participation, the principal must therefore increase the expected wage.
Both the increase in α and in the wage spread result in too strong incentives. Pre-
cision is consequently reduced to reestablish the equilibrium eﬀo r ta tt h er e q u i r e d
level. A similar argument applies for increases in β, noting that the increase in wage
spread needed to maintain participation results in too much eﬀort even though β has
increased.
6. Dlvfxvvlrq dqg frqfoxglqj frpphqwv
Remarking that actual pay systems appear more egalitarian than would seem to be
predicted by the economics of incentives, Baker et al. (1988) argue that ‘economic
explanations’ should be provided rather than drawing on the notions of ‘fairness’,
‘equity’ or ‘morale’ often stressed by practitioners. Still, supposing that equity con-
siderations are relevant, how far do they go in accounting for wage compression?
In the foregoing model a greater propensity for envy translates into a smaller wage
spread between winner and loser (at least in the interior solutions). Two factors are
at work. On the one hand more envy increases incentives, thereby allowing a smaller
spread to induce the required eﬀort. When workers extract rent, the spread is smaller
not because the principal cares about the workers’ dislike for inequities, but because
their inequity aversion makes smaller spreads feasible. On the other hand greater
envy also imposes a cost on workers. When participation constraints are binding,17
this increases wage costs. The principal then seeks to reduce the inequality premium
through better performance assessment so as to reduce the wage spread even further.
By contrast, fairness considerations in the sense of more fair-minded workers do not
generally lead to wage compression. The reason is that they reduce incentives and
must be compensated by other means. In the model, the principal compensates by
more careful performance assessments and generally also by larger spreads.
While these results were derived in the context of tournaments, similar conclusions
can be obtained with individualistic pay systems. To illustrate, consider a bonus
scheme in a ﬁrm with two workers with a propensity for envy (i.e. α > 0 and β =0 ).
Denote the base wage by l,t h eb o n u sb y∆wB and let p(e) be the probability of
meeting the ﬁxed standard for earning the bonus, where p  > 0 and p   < 0.A s s u m i n g
that meeting the standard constitutes independent events, a worker exerting eﬀort e e
when his co-worker exerts e has expected utility
l + p(e e)∆wB − c(e e) − p(e)(1 − p(e e))α[∆wB + c(e e) − c(e)]
The last term is the expected dissatisfaction from turning out worse oﬀ than the
co-worker.








Wage costs per worker are W(e)=l + p(e)∆w. When workers earn rent, l =0and
wage costs equal the expected bonus. In no-rent solutions,
WB(e)=uA + c(e)+p(e)(1 − p(e))α∆wB (21)
where the last term is the inequality premium.9 It is easily checked that the bonus
and therefore the potential for wage inequality is decreasing in α, while the inequality
9Disadvantageous inequality is experienced when only the co-worker gets the bonus. In equilib-
rium this occurs with probability p(e)(1−p(e)), hence the expression for the inequality premium in
(21).18
premium is increasing. The eﬀects of a greater propensity for envy is thus the same
as in the tournament model. That is, the principal would like to employ more envious
workers when rent needs to be paid out and less envious ones otherwise.10
Suppose now the principal can use either a tournament or a bonus scheme. How
do these compare given inequality aversion? In a tournament the outcome is always
unequal. Does this mean that tournaments are therefore characterized by a greater
inequality premium? If so, tournaments would be disadvantageous when participation
constraints are binding. Conversely, if tournaments give more scope to envy as a
motivator, they could have lower wage costs when workers earn rent.
For the sake of comparison, assume the probability of meeting the standard under
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That is, the probability of good performance is equally sensitive to eﬀort under either








This must be compared to the expected prize diﬀerence under the tournament. From










Finally, in no-rent solutions, wages costs under the tournament are
WT(e)=uA + c(e)+1
2α∆wT (25)
which must be compared to (21) for the bonus system.
Obviously, both schemes have the same wage costs if there is no envy (the inequal-
ity premia disappear and λB = λT =1 ). But what if workers are inequity averse?
10The eﬀects are similar if the information structure on which the bonus scheme is based is made
endogenous.19
Comparing the inequality premia in (21) and (25), it is clear that p(e)(1−p(e)) < 1
2,
i.e. the probability of experiencing disadvantageous inequity is always smaller with
the bonus system. However, this could be more than compensated by ∆wB being
much larger than ∆wT. As it turns out, one can indeed show that the inequality
premium is always smaller with the bonus system than with the tournament. Thus,
an individualistic bonus is more advantageous when the required eﬀort can be imple-
mented without paying out rent.
Whether a tournament should be used when workers earn rent is less clear cut.
A tournament has lower wage costs when λT < λB. The latter holds only if the
probability p(e) characterizing the bonus scheme is not too large11. The intuition is
as follows. In the tournament the marginal beneﬁtf r o mm o r ee ﬀort is proportional
to (1 + α),i nt h eb o n u ss y s t e mi ti sp r o p o r t i o n a lt o(1 + p(e)α).T h e r e a s o n i s
that, if a worker loses the tournament, he experiences disadvantageous inequality
with certainty. By contrast, if he does not get the bonus, disadvantageous inequality
is experienced only with probability p(e), which is the probability that the co-worker
independently gets the bonus. Thus, the marginal beneﬁtf r o mm o r ee ﬀort is greater
in the tournament, although the discrepancy is smaller the larger the probability
p(e). On the other hand, envy also aﬀects the disutility of eﬀort. As discussed in
the preceding sections, the disutility of eﬀort is increased by the expected frustration
from being outperformed. In the tournament, the marginal disutility of eﬀort is
(1 + 1
2α)c (e). In the bonus scheme, it is [1 + p(e)(1 − p(e))α]c (e). T h i si ss m a l l e r
than in the tournament and the more so when the probability of getting the bonus is
large. Overall, for p(e) suﬃciently large, the bonus scheme provides more incentives
per dollar of expected bonus and is therefore cheaper when workers earn rent.
Several other issues could be examined. For instance, Lazear (1989) showed that
wage compression is useful in reducing uncooperative behavior when rewards are
11The condition is always satisﬁed if p(e) is not greater than one half. For reasonable values of α,
say less than unity, the condition holds if p(e) is less than two thirds.20
b a s e do nr e l a t i v ec o m p a r i s o n sa n dw o r k e r sc a na d v e r s e l ya ﬀect each other’s perfor-
mance. If workers are inequity averse, sabotage could be a problem even in purely
individualistic bonus schemes and could lead to wage compression in such schemes
as well.12 Another possible extension is to consider the merit of group bonuses un-
der inequity aversion. There is no inequality premium if a bonus is paid only when
workers perform well as a group. This is presumably optimal if it can be achieved
without paying rent. By contrast, when rent cannot be avoided, an individual bonus
scheme or a tournament could possibly lead to lower wages because it relies more on
envy as a motivator.
Asshqgl{
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3 :We limit the proof to the corner solution where both
















, θ = α,β (26)










(λθ − µθ) (27)
The sign is negative for changes in α since λα and µα are respectively negative and
positive. For changes in β,b o t hλβ and µβ are positive. However, under the assump-
tion α > |β|,

















Noting that the expression in brackets in (26) is negative, CP is increasing in β.F o r



































(λα − µα) (29)
12See Mui (1995) for an interesting analysis of sabotaging behavior due to envy.21
This leads to dCP/dα as written in the text.
Tables 1 and 2: For corner solutions, hc is decreasing in both α and β as shown
in the proof of proposition 3. For interior solutions the eﬀects on h are obvious from










The eﬀects on ∆w then follow directly from the eﬀects on h. Using (30), ∆w decreases
with α in the no rent interior solution since λα is negative and h increases; the eﬀect
of a change in β is ambiguous. For corner solutions, ∆w increase with β since λβ is

















In the case with rent or in the no-rent corner solution, W = ∆w/2 and the eﬀects on
W follow from those on ∆w. In the no-rent interior solution,









the eﬀects on W follow directly from the changes in h.
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